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REIMBURSEMENT OF EXECUTIVES FOR CRIMINAL
LITIGATION EXPENSES*
EXECUTIVES may be defendants in expensive litigation arising out of their
activities on the corporate behalf.' Directors and stockholders are often in-
volved in shareholders' suits, antitrust cases, and other actions based on state
and federal law.2 While they are represented by the corporation counsel in
many instances,3 executives retain their own attorneys in others,4 and look
to the corporate treasury for reimbursement.5 Indemnity for such legal ex-
penses is often provided for in the by-laws,0 and occasionally by the employ-
ment contract.7 And there is also a common law right to reimbursement in
some states." However, when some courts not only restricted the common
*Schwarz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 305 N.Y. 395, 113 N.E2d 533 (1953).
1. The cost of litigating complex issues is sometimes astoundingly high. Duncan,
The "Big Case"-Whcn Tried Criminally, 4 AN. Rrs. L. REV. 99, 103 n.31 (19531;
Hornstein, Directors' Expenses It Stockholders' Suits, 43 Co- L. R . 301, 312 (1943).
Thus defense of one shareholder's suit cost directors $%,0U0. W.Vsszua;Tv::, Cvrtv.VL
ExEcuTnms' CoMPaFxsATIox 341 (1942). And some attorneys dnmand $1600 p~r day
as their trial fee to defend executives against antitrust charges. Brief for Appellant, p. 3,
Schwarz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 305 N.Y. 395, 113 N.X.d 533 (19531.
2. While the number of stockholders' suits has diminished in some states, Hornmt':in,
Aew Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 C(,L L. RLxV 1, 12 n.61 (1947).
Government prosecutions involving officials of corporations are numerous. There were
1048 executives indicted for criminal antitrust violations from 1945 to Septenbr, 1953.
Figures compiled from CCH TRADz Rr. REP. for the years 1945-1953. During the
same period, 557 officers and directors were prosecuted under the Federal Fued, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act. Figures compiled from U.S. FooD & Dnt'G Ao, xNsTzoLs;io., Norzcriz
OF JUDGMENT.
Executives may also run afoul of state antitrust laws, e.g., N.Y. GE:. Bu's. Lw:
§§ 340-7 (McKinney, 1941); MASs. ANN. LAWS c. 93, § 2 (1946), and security regula-
tion statutes, e.g., CAl. Coap. CODE §§ 25500-15 (Deering, 1952); KY. RW. SxT. c 292,
§ 292.040 (1953).
3. Twelve of fifteen corporations replying to a questionnaire follow this practice.
Occasionally the defendants will retain the corporation's lawyer at their own exp nse.
Communications to the YArx LAW Jour-.A. in Yale Law Library.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Baugh & Sons, CCH TRA R.EG. Rrx. 3 67,507 (E.D.
Pa. 1953); United States v. Minneapolis Electrical Contractors Ass'n, CCH Tmmz RwG
Rp,. ff 67,488 (D. Alinn. 1953) ; United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 186 F2d 562
(7th Cir. 1951).
5. When individual counsel is employed, an effort is usually made in advance to
secure indemnity. Communication to the YALE LAw JOURNAL from V. Henry Rothschild,
2d, dated September 25, 1953, in Yale Law Library. Mr. Rothschild is co-author of the
treatise cited infra note 34.
6. Ibid.
7. See, e.g., Mooney v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 204 F2d &3 (3d Cir. 1953).
S. See, e.g., 1i; re E. C. Warner Co., 232 Mfinn. 207, 45 N.A,.2d 333 (1950) (eecu-
tive vindicated on merits in stockholder's suit); Solimine v. Hollander, 129 N.J. Eq. 264,
19 A.2d 34-4 (Ch. 1941) (same); Figge v. Bergenthal, 1ZP Wttc. 54, 1T9 -N.WV. 5S1
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law right,0 but also cast doubt on the validity of by-law provisions,"° legis-
latures in sixteen states passed indemnity statutes to protect corporate
officers."
The New York statute is typical in providing for reimbursement in "any
action, suit or proceeding"' 2 except where the parties are adjudged liable for
misconduct or negligence. 13 However, while most statutes simply state that
the corporation shall, subject to similar restrictions, 14 have the power to
indemnify,' 5 the New York statute also specifically provides for court-ordered
reimbursement.' 6 There, an executive has a statutory cause of action to
recover his expenses where his company is unwilling to reimburse.'1
(1906), rehearing denied, 130 Wisc. 626, 110 N.W. 798 (1907) (same). For a thorough
analysis of these and other cases see WASHINGTON, CORPORATE ExEcuTivEs' COMI'eNSA-
TiON 334-55; 29 CHI-KENT REV. 344 (1951); 26 NOTRE DAME LAW. 540 (1951).
9. See, e.g., New York Dock Co. v. McCollom, 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup.
Ct. 1939) (recovery of expenses by director only if a substantial benefit accrues to the
corporation as a result of his defense) ; Griesse v. Lang, 37 Ohio App. 553, 175 N.E. 222
(1931) (same).
10. Several commentators drew this conclusion from the McCollom case, supra note
9. See, e.g., Ballantine, California's 1943 Statute as to Directors' Litigation Expenses:
An Exclusive Remedy for Indemnification of Directors, Officers, and Employees, 31
CALIF. L. Rav. 515, 516 (1943) ; Bates & Zuckert, Directors' Indemnity: Corporate Policy
Or Public Policyf, 20 HARv. Bus. Ray. 244, 246 (1942).
11. CAL. CoRu. CODE § 830 (Deering, 1952) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5129 (1949) ; DEL
CoRP. LAW ANN. § 2(10) (1949); Ky. REV. STAT. c. 271, § 271.375 (1953); ME. REV.
STAT. c. 49, § 23 (1944) ; MD. CODE ANN. art. 23, § 60 (Flack, 1951) ; MICu. STAT. ANN.
§ 21.10 (Supp. 1951); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.09(7) (Supp. 1952); Mo. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 351.355 (1949); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. tit. 15, § 412 (1947); NEV. CoMP. LAWS
§ 1608(6) (Supp. 1943-9); N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3-14 (Supp. 1952); N.Y. GEN.
CoRP. LAW §§ 63-8 (McKinney, Supp. 1953); PENNA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1323 (Pur-
don, 1953) ; R.I AcTs 1948, c. 2154, p. 517; Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 180.04(14) (1951).
12. N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW §§ 63-4 (McKinney, Supp. 1953). Other states employing
the same language are: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, Nevada, and Wisconsin.
California's statute applies to "any proceeding ... whether brought by a corporation,
receiver, trustee, shareholders, governmental body, public official. . . ." Rhode Island's
statute indemnifies officers and directors against "all claims and liabilities." Kentucky's
wording is "any action." Pennsylvania awards reimbursement in "any suit brought to
enforce a secondary right of stockholders." See statutes cited note 11 supra.
13. Twelve state statutes follow the New York wording in this respect: Connecticut,
Delaware, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
vada, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. California, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania have
slightly different provisions. Statutes cited supra note 11.
14. See note 13 supra.
15. These include: Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, New Jersey, Nevada, and Wisconsin. Connecticut and Rhode Island specify
that a corporation may permit indemnification in the by-laws. Maine and New York
state that a corporation may permit indemnification in the certificate of incorporation,
in the by-laws, or by resolution in specific situations. Statutes cited supra note 11.
16. N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 64 (McKinney, Supp. 1953). California and Pensyl-
vania alone have similar provisions. See note 11 supra.
17. Directors have recovered expenses in civil litigation under this provision. See,
[Vol. 63
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In the recent case of Schwar.z v. General Aniline & Film Corp.,18 an at-
tempt was made for the first time to use the statutory court-ordered reim-
bursement provision to recover the costs of defending a criminal action.
Schwarz, an officer and director of General Aniline, had been indicted for
violation of the antitrust laws. 19 He pleaded nwlo contendere and was fined
$500. 2o After the corporation refused to indemnify him for his $7,500
legal expense, or for the fine, Schwarz sued in the New York courts to recover
his loss. The trial court denied recovery on the ground that his plea of nolo
constituted an adjudication of misconduct, barring relief by the terms of the
statute.21 The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion."" In the New
York Court of Appeals three dissenting judges disagreed .3 However, the
majority, consisting of four judges, did not consider this question, but denied
relief on the broad ground that the legislature had not intended to include
the costs of defending a criminal action under the court-ordered reimburse-
ment provision.24 Under this view a defendant could not recover his expenses
even if he were acquitted after trial.
Although Schwarz clearly bars court-ordered reimbursement in criminal
cases, it apparently does not threaten the legality of indemnity paid voluntarily
by the company. A concurring judge, who cast the deciding vote for the
majority view, expressly approved reimbursement for criminal expenses by
provision in the articles of incorporation or by-laws, or by resolution of the
shareholders.2 5 Since most other statutes provide only that the corporation
e.g., Diamond v. Diamond, 200 Misc. 1074, 108 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd, 281
App. Div. 1015, 121 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1st Dep't 1953) ; Dornan v. Humphrey, 278 App. Div.
1010, 106 N.Y.S.2d 142 (4th Dep't 1951), rehearing denied, 110 N.Y.S2d 471 (4th Dep't
1952) ; Tichner v. Andrews, 193 Misc. 1050, 85 N.Y.S2d 760 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
18. 305 N.Y. 395, 113 N.E2d 533 (1953).
19. Defendants were charged with conspiring to restrain trade by forming an illegal
cartel in photographic materials in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Indictment
No. 111-136, filed on December 19, 1941 in the District Court of the United States for
the Southern District of New York.
20. Schwarz tried unsuccessfully to recover his litigation expenses in federal court.
His petition was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. Petition of Schwarz, 94 F. Supp.
129 (1950).
21. Schwarz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 198 Misc. 1046, 102 ,.Y.S2d 325
(Sup. Ct 1951).
22. Schwarz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 279 App. Div. 996, 112 X.Y.S2d 146
(1st Dep't 1952). Judge Van Voorhis, dissenting, argued that a plea of liolo vas not
an adjudication of misconduct. Id. at 996, 997-8, 112 N.Y.S2d at 147, 148-50.
23. Schwarz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 305 N.Y. 395, 407, 113 .E.2d 533,
538 (1953).
24. Id. at 400, 113 N.E.2d at 535.
25. Id. at 405, 113 N.E.2d at 537. Recent changes in the personnel of the Court
indicate that Schwar will not be extended. Judge Carswell, w ho cast the crucial vote,
died shortly after his concurring opinion was filed. Judge Van Voorhis, %vho voted for
recovery when the principal case was in the Appellate Division, now sits on the Court
of Appeals. N.Y. Times, April 24, 1953, p. 35, col. 1.
1953]
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may reimburse 2 6 the Court of Appeals' holding should not influence voluntary
payment of criminal litigation expenses in these states. And of the two states
besides New York that make statutory provision for court-ordered indemnity,
one by its terms excludes,27 while the other apparently allows, 28 recovery of
the kind denied by the New York court. Thus, since prevalent corporate
practice is the voluntary reimbursement of executives on by-law authority
for expenses incurred in either civil or criminal cases'2 0 Schward effect may
be limited.
The dichotomy between permitting voluntary indemnification and disallow-
ing court-ordered reimbursement seems anomalous. Schwarz does violence to
the aim of the New York legislature, which redrafted the reimbursement
statutes in 1945 in an effort to make "consistent" the provisions for court-
ordered and voluntary reimbursement.30 If the New York court reasoned
correctly that the legislature did not intend the words "any action, suit or
proceeding" to cover criminal suit expenses in the court-ordered reimburse-
ment section of the statute, it becomes difficult to argue that the legislature
intended an opposite meaning by the same words in the by-law authorization
section. Moreover, the legislative purpose of protecting directors I, seems
thwarted by dismissing without remedy an official who cannot secure reim-
bursement under permissive corporate by-laws because, as in Schwarg, he
is a member of a faction no longer in control.3 2  Some courts, unwilling to
justify different standards for court-ordered and voluntary reimbursement,
26. The statutory provisions are cited in note 15 supra. For a similar view see Com-
ment, 40 CALIF. L. Rxv. 104, 111 (1952).
27. The Pennsylvania statute applies by its terms only to expenses incurred in stock-
holders' derivative suits. PENNA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1323 (Purdon, 1953).
28. The California statute permits recovery of expenses incurred in any suit brought
"by a corporation . . . shareholders, governmental body. . . ." CAL. CORP. CoDE § 830
(Deering, 1952) (emphasis added). For a discussion of the California statute see Ballan-
tine, Californids 1943 Statute as to Directors' Litigation Expenses: An Exclusive Remedy
for Indemnification of Directors, Officers, and Employees, 31 CALIF. L. REV. 515 (1943).
29. See source cited note 5 supra.
30. The former New York statutory provision for court-ordered reimbursement re-
stricted indemnity for expenses to those incurred in any action "brought by the corpora-
tion or brought in its behalf." N.Y. LAWS 1941, c. 350, § 61-a. The 1945 revision changed
this language to cover "any action, suit or proceeding." N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 64. This
had always been the language of the by-law authorization section of the New York
statute. N.Y. LAws 1941, c. 209, § 27-a. The change in wording was a studied effort
toward consistency. N.Y. LAW REVIsION COMM., RECOMMENDATION AND STUDY RELAT-
ING TO REIMBURSEMENT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES OF CORPORATE OFFICIALS 131, 139
(1945).
31. 75 Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COmm. ON STATE LEGISLA-
TION rep. no. 188, p. 513 (1941); NEw YORK STATE BAR Ass'N, Comm. ON STATE LEGIS-
LATION rep. no. 9, p. 27 (1941) ; Hornstein, supra note 1, at 301; Note, 37 CORNELL L.Q.
78, 84 (1951).




may extend Schwarz to bar even voluntary reimbursement under statutory
authority.
However, courts have been traditionally more willing to sustain reimburse-
ment once paid, than to order an unwilling corporation to indemnifv.
Stockholders attacking the legality of payments to executives must overcome
the rule that an exercise of business judgment by directors will not be over-
turned except in cases approaching fraud.34 And where stockholders have
ratified the payment or the by-law under which payment is authorized, dis-
senters have an even heavier burden of proof.3 5 Thus, upon a finding that
all the parties acted in good faith, a New York court has allowed a corpora-
tion to finance voluntarily the defense of executives in a criminal action, even
though they were adjudged guilty of violating the Sherman ActP In effect,
Schwarz, narrowly read, makes reimbursement of criminal litigation expenses
a matter of business discretion, in which the court is generally unwilling to
substitute its judgment for that of directors and shareholders.
Even if Schwarz is treated broadly by other courts to bar any criminal
case reimbursement under indemnity statutes, executives may have a common
law right to recovery in some states.37 One line of cases permits recovery
where the executive defended a vital corporate interest.33 On this reasoning,
executives have recovered their expenses when they opposed minority stock-
holders' attempts to throw the company into receivership3 9 or to upset a re-
33. Compare Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.XYS2d 270
(Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd mer., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S2d 589 (1st Dep't 1944) (court
refused to upset corporate outlays for executives), and Blish v. Thompson Automatic
Arms Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 538, 64 A.2d 581 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (same), with New York
Dock Co. v. McCollom, 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (court refused
to compel corporation to reimburse directors), and Hoch v. Duluth Brewing & Malting
Co., 173 Mlinn. 374, 217 NAV. 503 (1928) (same).
34. For statements of this "proper business judgment rule," see Clamitz v. Thatcher
Mfg. Co., 158 F2d 687, 693 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 825 (1947); Diamond v.
Davis, 3S N.Y.S2d 103, 115 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd mer., 292 N.Y. 554, 54 N.E2d C-93
(1944). And see cases and discussion in ,VWsH NTo & RoTHscnim, CoxE&NsAT1NG
THE CORPORATE E-XEcutrE 383412 (1951).
35. See, e.g., Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 17-13, 99 X.E. 138,
142 (1912). For collection of cases see WVAsHINGTON & RorHscnHL, op. di. supra note
34, at 252-5.
36. Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 3S N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. CL 1942),
aff'd mer., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1st Dep't 1944). For a similar good
faith theory see Kanneberg v. Evangelical Creed Corp., 146 Wisec. 610, 131 N.W. 353
(1911).
37. See note 8 mpra. For a recent judicial view that common law recovery is being
liberalized, see Mooney v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 204 F.2d 888, 899 (3d Cir.
1953).
38. See, e.g., Albrecht, Maguire & Co. v. General Plastics, Inc., 256 App. Div. 134,
139, 9 N.Y.S2d 415, 420 (4th Dep't), af'd, 250 N.Y. 840, 21 X.E.2d &V (1939) ; Espo-
sito v. Riverside Sand & Gravel Co., 287 Mass. 185, 187, 191 N.E. 363, 364 (1934).
39. Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., 181 App. Div. 75, 78, 168 X.Y.Supp. 251, 254
(1st Dep't 1917), af'd, 227 N.Y. 656, 126 N.E. 903 (1920).
1953]
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organization plan.40  Defending a corporate business practice in a criminal
antitrust attack may be similarly treated. But courts have sometimes denied
common law recovery on the ground that the expenses did not flow directly
from performance of official duties, but resulted from alleged personal mis-
conduct.41 Since the line between defense of a corporate interest and alleged
personal misconduct is sometimes thin,42 directors would be ill-advised to
rest on their common law rights.
In view of the present uncertainty regarding executive reimbursement
rights, corporate officials would do well to secure employment contracts
that specifically provide for recovery of criminal litigation expenses. Such
added protection would hedge against the possibility that Schwar may be
extended to bar by-law recovery. Even if the New York case is limited to
its facts, a particular corporation may have no by-law provisions or may be
unwilling to reimburse under permissive by-laws. And though a corporation
wants to reimburse, it may doubt its power to do so when its by-laws make
no specific reference to criminal cases. The additional protection afforded
by contract is indirectly sanctioned by many reimbursement laws, which ex-
pressly provide that the statutory authority is not exclusive.43  Interpreting
such a provision in the Delaware statute, a recent Third Circuit case held that
a director could recover his expenses in defending a shareholder's suit, on
the independent theory that his contract with the corporation provided for
such indemnity. 44 Thus a carefully worded contract might insure recovery
40. Corey v. Independent Ice Co., 226 Mass. 391, 395, 115 N.E. 488, 490 (1917).
41. See, e.g., Hoch v. Duluth Brewing & Matting Co., 173 Minn. 374, 217 N.W. 503
(1928) (no recovery for expenses in land fraud criminal case even though there was a
successful defense on the merits); Du Puy v. Crucible Steel 'Co. of America, 288 Fed.
583 (W.D. Pa. 1923) (recovery denied for criminal litigation expenses in tax fraud
case even though the director was successful on the merits).
42. A director accused of falsely registering securities was held to have defended a
corporate interest when he defended himself. Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corp.,
30 Del. Ch. 538, 64 A.2d 581 (Sup. Ct. 1948). However, a director accused of filing a
false tax return for the corporation was denied recovery. Du Puy v. Crucible Steel Co. of
America, 288 Fed. 583 (W.D. Pa. 1923).
43. See, e.g., Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, and Wis-
consin (statutes not exclusive of other rights under any statute, by-law, agreement, vote
of stockholders or otherwise).
Missouri's statute provides that "the right to indemnification herein provided shall
not be exclusive of any other rights to which such director or officer may be lawfully
entitled." In New Jersey, the statutory remedy is "in addition to and not in restriction
or limitation of any other privilege or power which a corporation of this State may have
with respect to the indemnification or reimbursement of directors, trustees, officers or
employees." New York's statute says that "such right of indemnification shall not be
deemed exclusive of any other rights to which such director, officer or employee may be
entitled apart from this statute." Rhode Island's provision "shall not be deemed to
exclude any other right or privileges to which such person may be entitled." Statutes
cited note 11 supra.
44. "Where there exists, as there does here, an independent ground for the payment
of litigation expenses [the contract], we see no reason to make an overriding reference
(Vol. 63
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of criminal case expenses even where reimbursement is in doubt on com-
mon law, by-law, or statutory theories.
Certain restrictions on the use of employment contract indemnification are
necessary to prevent unjustified claims for reimbursement. Courts will prob-
ably not enforce such clauses unless they were bargained-for, provide for
reimbursement of only reasonable expenses, and result in sonic benefit to the
corporation. 45 Such a benefit may be the executive's remaining in corporate
employ, 46 or his incentive to do better work because of the added security
afforded by the clause.4 Where the executive is already obligated tu serve
for a period, or where he shares in other incentive devices, granting reim-
bursement rights may be called an illegal gift of corporate funds.4 s But an
amendment to the contract should be upheld if the director agrees to per-
form added tasks or to serve for a longer term than originally fixed in return
for his reimbursement clause.49 In addition to the requirement that indemnity
clauses be supported by consideration, courts should prohibit reinibursemint
of criminal litigation expenses where the executive was adjudged liable for
negligence or misconduct. Such a standard is required by almust all indemni-
fication statutes 50 and by the cases permitting common law recovery, and
will probably also govern contractual reimbursement.P What constitutes
negligence or misconduct is an issue made irrelevant by Sehwarz' broad
theory prohibiting court-ordered reimbursement of any criminal litigation
expenses. Such an issue will become crucial if Schwarz can be circumvented
by contractual provisions.
to the statute." Mooney v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 204 F.2d Q-S, S90 (3d Cir.
1953). Although Mooncy dealt with civil litigation expenses, it seens dioubtful that a
contract providing for reimbursement of criminal case expenses xvwuld be trcated diffcr-
ently. See Schwarz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 305 N.Y. 395, 405, 113 N.E-d 533,
537 (1953) (concurring opinion).
45. A corporation may contract to reimburse a director in exchange for resignation
before the term of his employment contract has expired. "Out of the context of a
termination agreement, all of these payments might be ultra vircs as mere gifts:' Money
v. Vrillys-Overland Motors, Inc., 204 F2d 888, 895 (3d Cir. 1953).
46. See, e.g., Sandler v. Schenley Industries, Inc., - Del. Ch. -, 79 A.2d 606, 619
(Ch. 1951) (employment contract justifies stock option); Holthusen v. Budd Mfg. Co.,
53 F. Supp. 48, 490 (E.D. Pa. 1943) (same).
47. Cf. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 22 U.S.L. WE.x 2150 (Del. Ch. October
8, 1953) (increased incentives held good consideration for executive compensation);
Eliasberg v. Standard Oil Co., 23 N.J. Super. 431 (1952) (same).
4. For analysis of the legal problems involved in amending contracts see VAsHL.G-
ToN & Rornscsar, op. cit. supra note 34, at 269-71 and cases cited therein.
49. Ibid.
50. See note 13 supra.
51. One court has indicated that the statutory standard sets "realistic limits" on the
right of indemnification. See Mooney v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 204 F2d t$3,
896 (3d Cir. 1953).
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